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Group 5
Identify and outline the main features of the polluter 
pays principle. Show how PPP may be the most effective 
instrument for ‘greening’ (rejuvenating) the current 





1 out of 5 is recycled
5 minutes
More wealth, More products
More products, More waste
There is more pollution as people become wealthier.
Moving to cities and an improving standard of living
are both signs of economic progress. But even if these
demographic shifts continue, the projected rates of
waste aren’t entirely inevitable.
The quantity of garbage we generate reflects the amount
of new products we buy and the energy, resources and
upstream waste that are involved in producing those
items.
Rylands v Fletcher (1868)
This case was decided well before environmental law was heard of, it
developed the concept that “the polluter pays”
A mill owner (Mr Rylands) employed a contractor to build a reservoir
on rented land
The contractor filled in some disused mine shafts on the land which was
to become part of the reservoir
The reservoir was then filled with water
The reservoir flooded adjacent mines owned by Mr. Fletcher
Mr. Fletcher sued
The first hearing
Mr Fletcher succeded on the basis of trespass over and nuisance to his
land by Mr. Rylands
The case went to appeal
The first appeal hearing
The court overturned the judgment arguing that “intent” needs to be
proved in trespass or nuisance cases and there was no “intent” by Mr.
Rylands to flood Mr. Fletcher’s mines
The court also said “there is nothing offensive to the senses about
water” and “Mr. Rylands had been involved in lawful act” (i.e. building
a reservoir, water is not a poisonous or noxious substance of itself). It
was a bad luck
Mr. Fletcher appealed
The Court of Appeal: 
“a person who for his own purposes brings on his land and 
collects or keeps there, anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it at his peril. He is answerable for all the 
damage which is the natural consequences of its escape”
i.e. if you have done it and caused damage, you are liable
i.e. Mr. Fletcher (the mine owner) won
Mr. Rylands appealed, but the House of Lords agreed with the 
Court of Appeal 
This case was constantly followed ever since this decision
“polluter pays” was developed
“Polluter pays” principle (PPP)
Popular in recent times
“you make a mess you clean it up”
The parties who generate pollution, whether
governmental or not, should bear the cost of abatement
Received the strongest support from OECD and EC
Guiding Principles Concerning the International 
Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies (May 
1972)- OECD Council Recommendation
“In order to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state, the 
polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the pollution 
prevention and control measures. And such costs of the measures should 
be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in 
production and/or consumption”
Origin of the PPP: OECD document
OECD (1972), “Environment and Economics: Guiding Principles
Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies”
The basis of the principle- the polluter should bear the expense of
implementing measures imposed by public agencies to ensure that the
environment is protected.
The internalization of costs should be reflected in the cost of goods and
services which cause pollution during production and/or consumption
Although the OECD consists of official government representations, the
recommendation was never formally ratified by any government.
Main Features of the PPP
Expenses that polluter should bear are decided by public authorities
(whether in by preventive measures, restoration, or a combination of both)
Polluter’s expenses include pollution prevention and control measures.
Polluter pays for pollution control and prevention measures in any case
(imposition, charges, other economic mechanisms, or direct regulation). The
private cost of goods and services should reflect the scarcity of
environmental resources.
Different environmental policies and standards
What PPP is not?
Compensation
Prevention measure
A tool for fully internalizing the pollution costs
A tool for bringing pollution to an optimum level
PPP in International Law
The Rio Declaration (1992)
Agenda 21 (1992)
The Rio Declaration (1992)
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
Principle 16:
“National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost 
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment”
Principle 13:
States should develop “national law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage”
Agenda 21 (1992)
Implicitly recognized PPP in several of its provisions
Section 5 (d) of Agenda 21:
“To introduce or strengthen policies that would encourage
self-sufficiency [include] pricing mechanisms which
internalize environmental costs”
Regional development of the PPP
EU: 
-Treaty of Rome (1957 amended in 1987 by the Single European Act 
(1987))
-Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment (1993)
Caribbean 
- The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
Treaty of Rome (1957)
-Article 174 (2) of the Treaty of Rome provides:
-“environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at 
source and […] the polluter should pay”
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Resulting form Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment (1993)
“Having regard to the desirability of providing for strict liability in 
this field taking into account the Polluter Pays Principle”
Convention that speaks specifically to the “polluter pays” principle
Objective: ensure adequate compensation for damage from 
activities which pose a danger or threat to the environment
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
Article 65 – Environmental protection:
“Community shall promote measures to ensure [among
others ] the principle that the polluter pays”






1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) (1980)
2. The Resource Conservation And Recovery Act (RCRA) 
3. The Clean Air Act (1970)
4. The Clean Water Act (1977)
5. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
The Clean Water Act (1977)
Prohibits “discharge of any pollutant by any person” into waters of the 
US
Regulated the discharge of pollutants through a permitting program
Requires each state to adopt water quality standards for the water bodies 
located within its borders which serve as the basis for treatment controls 
and waterqulity protection strategies. 
UK
Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment and another, Ex Parte Standley and
others (National Farmers Union, Intervener) (1999)
“It must be understood as requiring the person who causes the pollution, and that
person along, to bear not only the costs of remedying pollution but also those
arising form the implementation of a policy of prevention”
“The person responsible for the harmful effect wil then be required to make good or
bear the cost of that harm”
Canada
Court cases (The Queen v Hydro-Quebec)
Canadian provincial jurisdictions
Federal environmental legislation
Imperial Oil Ltd. v Quebec (Minister of Environment) (2003)
Imperial Oil Ltd. v Quebec (Minister of 
Environment)
From 1920 to 1973 Imperial Oil Ltd. Had owned and operated a 
petroleum depot on property subsequently sold in 1979.
Minister of Environment of Quebec decided to issue an order against 
Imperial Oil to study and assess the contamination of lands which it 
formerly used and owned.
The study revealed that the land was contaminated 
The Minister of Environment issued an Order against Imperial Oil to 
cover the costs of contamination caused by the company’s previous use 
of the property
Imperial Oil sued the Minister on the ground of bias
What do you think the outcome was?
The Court found that the Minister had in fact followed the procedural 
requirements and in issuing judgment against imperial Oil, applied the 
“polluter pays” principle, one of the main environmental principles in 
Quebec’s legislation
The Imperial Oil had to pay
India
1. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India (1991):
The court ruled that: “Remediation of the damaged environment is part of the process of 
“Sustainable Development” and as such polluter is liable to apply the cost to the 
individual sufferers as well as the cost of reversing the damaged ecology”
2. Mehta v . Union of India (1996):
“if rights were violated by the disturbance of the environment, damages could be 
awarded not only for the disturbance of the ecological imbalance, but also for the victims 
who have suffered due to that disturbance”
Polluter Pays!
As an effective principle for ‘greening’ the current global economy
This section will show how Polluter Pays Principle is the most 
effective guiding principle for applying the economic instruments to 
rejuvenate the current global economy.
Economic instruments aim to institute full cost pricing by costing and charging full
scarcity cost for resource depletion and full damage cost for environmental
degradation (T Panayotou:1994).
Full cost pricing is given by the formula: P = MPC + MUC + MEC
Where, P = price
MPC = marginal (or incremental) production cost
MUC = marginal user (or depletion) cost
MEC = marginal environmental (or damage) cost.
At A: P*= MSOC≡MPC + MUC + MEC 
where P*= optimal price, MSOC = 
marginal social opportunity cost, MPC 
= marginal production cost; MUC = 
marginal user (or depletion) cost; MEC
= marginal environmental (damage) 
cost. 
Q* = optimal output; resources freed 
by the reduction of the polluting output 
from Q0 down to Q* move to other 
products with lower social costs (e.g., 
resource saving and environment-
friendly). 
MPC* internalized by removal of 
distortionary subsidies. 
MUC* internalized through secure 
property rights 
MEC* internalized through taxes, 
charges, tradeable permits or other 
economic instruments Figure 1. Unaccounted social costs (S+MUC0+MEC0), underpricing 
and overproduction (P0, Q0) vs. internalizing of external costs (P*, Q*)
Full Cost Pricing
Source: UNEP, 1994
Internalizing External Costs Through Economic Instruments
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration states that: 
“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution with due 
regard to public interest and without distorting international trade and investment 
(UN, 1992).”
In other words, polluters should not become free riders at the expense of the 
collectivity.
PPP (Economic Instruments)







 Performance Bonds And Deposit Refund Systems
Property Rights 
Excessive resource depletion and environmental degradation
results from the absence (or thinness) of markets in resource
and environmental assets due to open access. So therefore,
With secure property rights, resource depletion is internal to
the owners/users (T Panayotou:1994).
Market Creation 
In the case of environmental pollution, property rights are technically impossible.
Therefore, one solution is for the state to provide the desired level of environmental quality
(like other public goods) and pay for it through general taxation.
This can be effected through a combination of pollution control regulations, incentives, and
public investment in pollution abatement (Pearman, 2003). An alternative is to try and
mimic the market, in fact, to create a market in environmental quality. This approach treats
the environment as a scarce, yet unmarketed and unpriced resource which is overused
because it is free (Kete, N, 1994).
Fiscal Instruments 
Fiscal instruments such as taxes and subsidies could be used to bridge the gap between
private and social costs/benefits.
For example, the prices of polluting products such as gasoline or pesticides do not
incorporate the social costs of damage to peoples' health and other activities which arise
from their use because these costs are external to the decision maker (producer or
consumer).
Hence, polluting inputs and final products are generally underpriced, both absolutely (in
terms of social costs) and in relation to non-polluting or less polluting products. This results
in overproduction and overconsumption which in turn result in environmental damage at a
higher than socially optimal level.
Charge Systems 
Charges are defined as payments for use of resources, infrastructure, and services
and are similar to market prices for private goods. One way of thinking of charges is
as “prices” for public goods or publicly provided private goods.
They differ from market prices for private goods because they are not market
determined but are administratively set by a government agency, a public utility, or
other types of regulated natural monopoly.
Financial Instruments 
Financial instruments have many similarities with subsidy and tax incentive systems
and share many of their limitations as well.
Financial instruments are distinguished from fiscal instruments because they are
often extra-budgetary and financed from foreign aid, external borrowing, debt for
nature swaps, and the like.
Financial instruments such as revolving funds, green funds, relocation incentives
and subsidized interest or soft loans are used for projects with significant positive
externalities e.g. reforestation.
Liability Instruments 
This class of instruments aims to induce socially responsible behavior by 
establishing  legal liability for;
(a) natural resource damage, 
(b) environmental damage, 
(c) property damage, 
(d) damage to human health or loss of life,
(e) non-compliance to environmental laws and regulations, and
(f) non-payment of due taxes, fees or charges.
Performance Bonds And Deposit Refund Systems
Environmental performance bonds and deposit refund systems are economic
instruments that aim to shift responsibility for controlling pollution, monitoring, and
enforcement to individual producers and consumers who are charged in advance for
the potential damage.
Example: bills for cleaning up oil spills and contaminated land, for collection and
treatment of hazardous waste, for reclamation of abandoned land after mining, for
reforestation after logging, and for man-made “natural” disasters.
Figure 2. Economic Instruments, Adapted: OECD, 1989
FISCAL INSTRUMENT
Pollution taxes: effluent taxes, 
emission taxes
Input taxes, product taxes, 
export taxes, import tariffs, 
etc
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Land titles, Water rights
Mining rights
Use rights-stewardship and 
licensing
MARKET CREATION
Tradeable emission permit, 
tradeable water share, 
tradeable resource shares, etc
BONDS AND DEPOSIT 
REFUND SYSTEMS
Environmental performance 
bonds, land reclamation bond, 










compliance charges, liability 
insurance, natural resource 
damage liability, enforcement 
incentives, etc
CHARGE SYSTEMS
Pollution charges, user 
charges, betterment charges, 
impact charges, access fees, 
road tolls, administrative 
charges
GRAPHICAL SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT
Elusiveness of the term 
‘Polluter’ — Q. is it possible 
to measure pollution? 
mimicking the food chain 
(more than one agent 
contributing to the 
nuisance), the person who 
causes pollution is always 
not easy to identify. Solution 
is to establish clarity and 
transparency in identifying 
the polluter which seems 
problematic. For example: 
charges placed on bottles 
should be paid by producers 
and importers, rather than 
charging the consumers.
Limitations of Polluter Pays Principle: 1
Source: Food Chains and Food Webs
Limitations of Polluter Pays Principle 2
2. Elusiveness of the term ‘Pay’—After identifying the polluter, how much should he pay?
Solution: Redistribution approach according to the intensity of pollution and the
proportionality of cost of prevention and control borne by local authorities.
Q. What if the local authorities are corrupt, will there be fairness??
3. It can be difficult to impose regulations or tax on firms from other countries. For
example, when we contribute to global warming, the problem effects everyone around
the world, but it can be difficult to create international agreements to impose penalties
on those polluting.
Limitations of Polluter Pays Principle 3
4. Pollution havens. These are countries which have weaker environmental
legislation, as a result, firms can escape taxes and regulations on pollution by
shifting production to those countries.
5. Administration costs of collecting information and implementing tax.
Criticism of Polluter Pays Principle
Some may argue that certain types of environmental pollution are so
bad that they should just be banned rather than taxing them even if the
polluter pays or is willing to pay some financial cost.
Conclusion
The limitations of implementing the Polluter Pays Principle doesn’t undermine its
validity. It just means in the real world it will be very difficult to get a perfect
approximation of the external cost. Yet still, as long as we get closer to the social
cost, there will be an increase in economic welfare.
At this juncture, I will like to state categorically that, the Polluter Pays Principle is
the most effective instrument for greening the current global economy despite its
limitation.---I rest my Case.
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